INCURABLE - ABOUT THE ELEPHANTS IN THE OPINION CORRIDOR
Reflections on world views and images of democracy based on some statements by Federal Minister Hubertus Heil on Markus Lanz on November 26th, 2024. And yes, it may also be a satirical rant and I have to go into a bit more detail and even mention Anne Applebaum and the U-word. My contribution could also contain traces of war weariness and enthusiasm for life.
By Michael Klade
By Michael Klade
Hubertus Heil is not responsible for his own name, neither for the first nor the second H. His innocence therefore also applies to all possible and impossible connotations and associations that could be derived from his surname or even his initials. Haha. So much for his defense. But Mr. H.H. is of course responsible for his statements, and if he tells hair-raising nonsense, it should be discussed, especially since Mr. H.H. holds a position of power as a federal minister and is paid to use his power responsibly.
To be fair, I admit that I did not start my comment with objective facts: that Mr. H.H. on Lanz, is my opinion, my judgment; and anyone who is interested should watch the show (even if it hurts a little) and think about it for themselves. Sapere aude and so on... For me, to be completely transparent, an excerpt from the talk show in question gave rise to thinking out loud about phenomena that are already on my mind. So I am trying to see the big picture in the small and to use a small example to examine much bigger problems. I have neither definitive answers nor solutions, I am not selling an ideology and I want this contribution to be nothing more (but also nothing less) than an opportunity to share my thoughts with others in order to stimulate thoughts and thus contribute to a somewhat better discourse, although the bar is admittedly set very low here, namely in the world of German talk shows.
When Lanz & Co invite more or less prominent figures to talk and the topic is controversial, there are always a few elephants in the studio. Anyone who doesn't like the anglicism of the elephant in the room can also break down the image: There are obvious and significant aspects that are conspicuous by their absence in the discussion, that are simply completely ignored, and whose exclusion narrows the range of opinions. The exclusion of certain positions begins with the determination of the topics of the program and the selection of guests, continues with the questions asked by the talk show hosts and extends to the reactions (or lack of reactions) of the talk show hosts to the guests' statements. So it's about processes that are nowadays often described with the Anglicism "framing", as well as the selection of positions that correspond to certain narratives. Undesirable contributions, i.e. opinions that do not fit the accepted narrative, are prevented by not inviting "controversial" people in the first place (and if they are, then only in the "all against one" format, where talk show hosts and guests verbally attack the persona non grata in order to expose their supposedly reprehensible attitude). Of course, all kinds of conspiracies can be suspected behind this; but a combination of old-fashioned conformism and opportunism is probably enough. To stay with the example of talk shows - confrontation is good for ratings, conformity is good for your career.
How does a media recipient like me become aware of the narrowing of the corridor of opinion? Well, there is the international comparison, for example. Since I live in Finland and am involved in both the English-speaking world both privately and professionally, As I deal with both the German-speaking world and the German-speaking world, I receive media in three different languages and from a relatively large number of different countries. When it comes to controversial topics that are of global interest, it becomes clear where the similarities and differences in reporting lie; in other words, how framing and narratives are handled in each case. Of course, this never applies to all media to the same extent; there is no such thing as "the media". However, it is all the more remarkable when a kind of consensus is formed on certain topics, when, for example, the reporting on Ukraine from TAZ to Welt adheres to the same "official" narrative. Views that do not fit into the narrow opinion corridor of this narrative can usually only be found in "alternative media". Thus, the journalists, philosophers, sociologists, diplomats, economists and many others whose opinions are not approved, no matter how famous they are, sit in various podcasts by various YouTubers and allow themselves to be interviewed there or they take part in the discussions that Lanz & Co do not allow.
equalized.
Without going too deeply into the Ukraine issue in this text, I must briefly explain what I mean by this "official narrative". After all, Mr. H.H. also assumes and makes it unmistakably clear that he will not tolerate any deviations in this regard. One of the central claims of this narrative is the defense of our freedom and Western values and interests in Ukraine. This includes a very selective, one-sided and under-complex presentation of the history of the war: Putin is solely to blame, the attack was unprovoked and the Russians' hunger for power is the only motivation. If one talks about the history at all, then only to denounce the naivety of previous governments; how wrong they were when they still sought rapprochement with Russia and believed in change through trade. In reality, according to the narrative, the Russians have always been concerned with imperial lust for power. Within the permitted corridor of opinion, Putin can either be seen as "only" an imperialist who threatens his neighbors, or as an equal as the Hitler of the 21st century, who will conquer all of Europe if he is not actively prevented. Of course, the West's strategy (if one can speak of a strategy) is also at the core of this narrative: Ukraine must not lose, must be supported until Putin ends his "brutal war of aggression that violates international law" so that Ukraine's integrity is preserved. Therefore, more and more weapons must be delivered, otherwise there is a risk of ruin. And if Putin is successful in Ukraine, according to the new domino theory, his hordes will attack the next neighboring country tomorrow and be standing in front of Berlin the day after tomorrow.
In this version of reality, the continuation of the war is definitely preferable to a "dictated peace", because the autocratic aggressor must not be rewarded. It is better to accept a few hundred thousand more deaths and risk the de-limitation of the war, possibly even a nuclear exchange. What seemed impossible during the Cold War is now being demanded by the loudest Ukraine cheerleaders: we must dare to wage good old-fashioned wars again, nuclear weapons or nuclear winter! We simply act as if this danger does not exist (they are only bluffing) and go far, further or even "all in"! Within the corridor of opinion that is now permitted in the public broadcasters and other "mainstream" media, the basic logic of the Western strategy is not questioned, nor are the backgrounds to the war, especially since these two areas are inextricably intertwined. Anyone who does not want to talk about the role that US foreign policy has played in this issue over the past decades, for example, will not be able to properly assess the importance of US foreign policy for the future of Ukraine. Anyone who acts as if NATO were a very nice little defense organization and the stupid autocrats just need to understand that we are not a threat to them will probably never be able to contribute anything more constructive to ending the war than "no dictated peace".
So the only thing being discussed is how far one should go in "supporting Ukraine", whether Scholz is a level-headed peace chancellor or a cowardly procrastinator; whether he wants to prevent an escalation of the war or enable his re-election. (The Lanz program indirectly played with the idea that Scholz could possibly play the role of a peace chancellor who tries to sell de-escalation and security to his voters out of selfish power interests.) Be that as it may, there are so many interesting perspectives on the war and so few are included in the discourse! For example, in many English-speaking media, the transatlantic perspective is treated much more openly and (self-)critically than in Germany (It's about NATO, stupid). Added to this are the perspectives of many individual countries, pan-European and part-European perspectives, perspectives from the "global south", from China, the level of global power politics (a little more cool, matter-of-fact John Mearsheimer and a little less defiant, hotheaded Anne Applebaum, please!), the level of conflicts of interest (armaments industry and politics), and I'll spare you the rest. Even Russian perspectives could be part of the discourse, perhaps even Ukrainian ones (and no, I don't mean the perspective of the Ukrainian government). But no way, we limit ourselves to the questionably framed "our freedom is being defended in Ukraine" perspective - and everything else is not only ignored, it is delegitimized.
Neither the cautious Ukraine supporters (Russia must not win) nor the aggressive Ukraine supporters (Russia must lose) can explain how this failure to win or even lossn Russia. How can we imagine this, especially today, towards the end of 2024, when the situation in Ukraine is becoming more and more desperate and the Russians are making ever faster progress in eastern Ukraine? There is less and less talk about the return of Crimea or all the other maximum demands that have always been propagated as a prerequisite for peace negotiations. Secretly, quietly and quietly, it seems to have been accepted that it will probably not work without compromises, but what a fair peace could look like is and remains completely unclear. What else is supposed to improve for Ukraine in the current situation, what is worth killing people on the front lines for day after day? Could someone please explain to me from the end how Russia will not have won and an acceptable peace could have been achieved? Without the delimitation of hostilities, without horizontal and/or vertical escalation, without a world war?
The difficulty of the apologists of the chosen strategy is shown by the strange formulations with which they torture our ears and insult our intelligence. Mr. H.H. also expressed himself very clumsily: "We must support Ukraine until Putin has won this war," he said on Lanz. And we need a situation in which others do not decide over the heads of the Ukrainians, or something like that. Until Putin has won this war? Aha, Mr. H.H., very interesting! And it is all the more interesting because the Russians are on the rise, Trump has won the election, Europe is divided and large parts of the "global south" support Russia rather than the West, if only because of the unbearable hypocrisy and arrogance that Western politicians repeatedly display.
How do you not lose, how do you win, what should or should not happen in each case? Those demanding arms deliveries, please explain it to us! We can't hope for miracles or divine intervention, can we? Nothing surprises me anymore! In my opinion, people like Anne Applebaum, who represent the extreme "Putin = Hitler position" and make correspondingly extreme demands, are particularly in need of explanation. When Ms. Applebaum received the Peace Prize(!) of the German Book Trade and was allowed to give a speech in the Paulskirche in connection with this, I was not surprised, for example, that the Polish-American neocon journalist demanded that the cult of violence in Russia should be ended militarily, just as it was ended in Germany in 1945. I knew the weakness of her arguments as well as the contradictions of her logic, and of course she ignores the fact that around 6,000 Russian nuclear warheads make the logic of war à la Berlin 1945 - let's say, somewhat problematic. Is she perhaps dreaming of the total capitulation of Russia in a bombed-out Moscow, with Putin putting a bullet through his head in the bunker? Even with conventional weapons, such a defeat of the Russians would result in unimaginable numbers of deaths, but the crucial question is but how can one prevent the use of nuclear weapons? I cannot imagine a situation that would lead to a nuclear holocaust as surely as the downfall of the Russian regime.
And just to be clear: I would also like to see the downfall of this regime and a completely different Russia! But anyone who does not see or does not want to see the unpleasant obstacles that lie between reality and desire is acting naively or lying. I was also not surprised that Applebaum's speech did not trigger a shitstorm. Indirectly calling for total war is within the permissible corridor of opinion, but calling for an end to arms deliveries or a less confrontational Russia policy is far outside it.
But the narrower this corridor becomes, the harder it is to ignore the elephant in the room: How does the West want to achieve its goals? How is Russia supposed to lose without using weapons of mass destruction, even as a last desperate act. I am also pretty sure that Mr. H.H.'s statements are also correct. will not trigger a shitstorm, because similar statements have been heard from other government and Union politicians in recent months, and as far as I can tell, there have never been any shitstorms. This is also about the now over-mentioned corridor of opinion, about the attitude towards those who dare, for example, to criticise the arms deliveries; it is about the understanding of democracy - and this point is also about contradictions. And Mr. H.H. provided a few excellent examples on Lanz that triggered me just as much as his cryptic and creative "until Putin has not won this war".
Even several minutes before he announced this supposed consensus forWhen he formulated a statement that we should all agree on, he said that we need to talk to citizens who have doubts, who are critical - I almost felt like I was being addressed! And yet I am not even a citizen of Germany! We must not put these doubtful and critical people in a corner, or something like that, said the Federal Minister. And yes, I absolutely agree with him! Please do not put me in a corner, perhaps even in the corner of Putin's friends! I am not a friend of Putin, I found him terrible 25 years ago, and I am not paid by Russia to criticize Western policy. (If anyone wants to pay me, please contact me!) Winking smiley. No, I am writing because no one is paying me at the moment and I therefore have time to write down my thoughts. Nothing more, nothing less.
Was I surprised by Mr. H.H.'s wisdom? Yes, indeed, because less than twenty seconds earlier he had spoken of "AfD-nosers" and "BSW activists", which he immediately excluded before talking about doubtful and critical citizens. In doing so, he did indeed put a not insignificant part of the population in a corner, which has now become a kind of sport among government representatives and Union politicians. Lanz has also often said, sometimes directly, sometimes indirectly, that these political fringes are not even counted among the "democratic parties". Lanz does not question such reports. In the program quoted here, Lanz also had no objections when Mr. H.H. did not want to put doubtful or critical citizens in a corner, but did not recognize AfD and BSW as either doubtful or critical citizens or not as legitimate citizens at all.
The talk show host only briefly questioned the adventurous formulation "AfD-nosers", whereupon Mr. H.H. made the "noses" into "people". However, this cosmetic correction did not change the content of the statement. I found the Federal Minister's explanation much more remarkable than the "noses": He was not talking about these "people" from the AfD and BSW because they "clearly do not represent the interests of this country and Europe". This is clear for Federal Minister H.H.! So clear that he does not even have to support his claim with arguments. I think this type of certainty is commonly referred to as "ideological".
To stay with the jargon of this text, Mr. H.H. sticks to its "official narrative" and does not tolerate any deviations that do not fit its central premises. This results in a narrowing of the corridor of opinion, which is also extended to the party landscape. Anyone who steps out of line is then quite simply no longer part of the "democratic parties", is declared a "nose", is excluded and put in a corner, even if a moment later they claim that they are not allowed to do exactly that! Should we laugh or cry?
Perhaps the Federal Minister should vote for another people, because I fear that the opposite will not work particularly well in the upcoming elections. He could vote for the Finnish people and emigrate. Here the Social Democrats are already in the opposition, share the right-wing government's stance on the Ukraine strategy and there are no level-headed hesitant people comparable to Scholz! Sounds good? But that is not an invitation from me, just satirical exaggeration! Just like the fact that Mr H.H. in the same program, he emphasized that one can have a different opinion. But only if the opinion is acceptable. The elephant may be the symbol of the Republicans, but here it is a (social) democratic elephant that is stuck in the narrow corridor of opinion and cannot move forward.
11/28/2024
Michael Klade (46) comes from Vienna, but has lived in Finland for many years, where he studied German, English and education. Over the years he has worked as a teacher at all school levels from preschool to university. When work and family neglect him, he likes to focus his energies on social issues. As an old German studies abroad and ex(iled) Austrian in the far north, he enjoys his outside perspective on the German-speaking countries.
To be fair, I admit that I did not start my comment with objective facts: that Mr. H.H. on Lanz, is my opinion, my judgment; and anyone who is interested should watch the show (even if it hurts a little) and think about it for themselves. Sapere aude and so on... For me, to be completely transparent, an excerpt from the talk show in question gave rise to thinking out loud about phenomena that are already on my mind. So I am trying to see the big picture in the small and to use a small example to examine much bigger problems. I have neither definitive answers nor solutions, I am not selling an ideology and I want this contribution to be nothing more (but also nothing less) than an opportunity to share my thoughts with others in order to stimulate thoughts and thus contribute to a somewhat better discourse, although the bar is admittedly set very low here, namely in the world of German talk shows.
When Lanz & Co invite more or less prominent figures to talk and the topic is controversial, there are always a few elephants in the studio. Anyone who doesn't like the anglicism of the elephant in the room can also break down the image: There are obvious and significant aspects that are conspicuous by their absence in the discussion, that are simply completely ignored, and whose exclusion narrows the range of opinions. The exclusion of certain positions begins with the determination of the topics of the program and the selection of guests, continues with the questions asked by the talk show hosts and extends to the reactions (or lack of reactions) of the talk show hosts to the guests' statements. So it's about processes that are nowadays often described with the Anglicism "framing", as well as the selection of positions that correspond to certain narratives. Undesirable contributions, i.e. opinions that do not fit the accepted narrative, are prevented by not inviting "controversial" people in the first place (and if they are, then only in the "all against one" format, where talk show hosts and guests verbally attack the persona non grata in order to expose their supposedly reprehensible attitude). Of course, all kinds of conspiracies can be suspected behind this; but a combination of old-fashioned conformism and opportunism is probably enough. To stay with the example of talk shows - confrontation is good for ratings, conformity is good for your career.
How does a media recipient like me become aware of the narrowing of the corridor of opinion? Well, there is the international comparison, for example. Since I live in Finland and am involved in both the English-speaking world both privately and professionally, As I deal with both the German-speaking world and the German-speaking world, I receive media in three different languages and from a relatively large number of different countries. When it comes to controversial topics that are of global interest, it becomes clear where the similarities and differences in reporting lie; in other words, how framing and narratives are handled in each case. Of course, this never applies to all media to the same extent; there is no such thing as "the media". However, it is all the more remarkable when a kind of consensus is formed on certain topics, when, for example, the reporting on Ukraine from TAZ to Welt adheres to the same "official" narrative. Views that do not fit into the narrow opinion corridor of this narrative can usually only be found in "alternative media". Thus, the journalists, philosophers, sociologists, diplomats, economists and many others whose opinions are not approved, no matter how famous they are, sit in various podcasts by various YouTubers and allow themselves to be interviewed there or they take part in the discussions that Lanz & Co do not allow.
equalized.
Without going too deeply into the Ukraine issue in this text, I must briefly explain what I mean by this "official narrative". After all, Mr. H.H. also assumes and makes it unmistakably clear that he will not tolerate any deviations in this regard. One of the central claims of this narrative is the defense of our freedom and Western values and interests in Ukraine. This includes a very selective, one-sided and under-complex presentation of the history of the war: Putin is solely to blame, the attack was unprovoked and the Russians' hunger for power is the only motivation. If one talks about the history at all, then only to denounce the naivety of previous governments; how wrong they were when they still sought rapprochement with Russia and believed in change through trade. In reality, according to the narrative, the Russians have always been concerned with imperial lust for power. Within the permitted corridor of opinion, Putin can either be seen as "only" an imperialist who threatens his neighbors, or as an equal as the Hitler of the 21st century, who will conquer all of Europe if he is not actively prevented. Of course, the West's strategy (if one can speak of a strategy) is also at the core of this narrative: Ukraine must not lose, must be supported until Putin ends his "brutal war of aggression that violates international law" so that Ukraine's integrity is preserved. Therefore, more and more weapons must be delivered, otherwise there is a risk of ruin. And if Putin is successful in Ukraine, according to the new domino theory, his hordes will attack the next neighboring country tomorrow and be standing in front of Berlin the day after tomorrow.
In this version of reality, the continuation of the war is definitely preferable to a "dictated peace", because the autocratic aggressor must not be rewarded. It is better to accept a few hundred thousand more deaths and risk the de-limitation of the war, possibly even a nuclear exchange. What seemed impossible during the Cold War is now being demanded by the loudest Ukraine cheerleaders: we must dare to wage good old-fashioned wars again, nuclear weapons or nuclear winter! We simply act as if this danger does not exist (they are only bluffing) and go far, further or even "all in"! Within the corridor of opinion that is now permitted in the public broadcasters and other "mainstream" media, the basic logic of the Western strategy is not questioned, nor are the backgrounds to the war, especially since these two areas are inextricably intertwined. Anyone who does not want to talk about the role that US foreign policy has played in this issue over the past decades, for example, will not be able to properly assess the importance of US foreign policy for the future of Ukraine. Anyone who acts as if NATO were a very nice little defense organization and the stupid autocrats just need to understand that we are not a threat to them will probably never be able to contribute anything more constructive to ending the war than "no dictated peace".
So the only thing being discussed is how far one should go in "supporting Ukraine", whether Scholz is a level-headed peace chancellor or a cowardly procrastinator; whether he wants to prevent an escalation of the war or enable his re-election. (The Lanz program indirectly played with the idea that Scholz could possibly play the role of a peace chancellor who tries to sell de-escalation and security to his voters out of selfish power interests.) Be that as it may, there are so many interesting perspectives on the war and so few are included in the discourse! For example, in many English-speaking media, the transatlantic perspective is treated much more openly and (self-)critically than in Germany (It's about NATO, stupid). Added to this are the perspectives of many individual countries, pan-European and part-European perspectives, perspectives from the "global south", from China, the level of global power politics (a little more cool, matter-of-fact John Mearsheimer and a little less defiant, hotheaded Anne Applebaum, please!), the level of conflicts of interest (armaments industry and politics), and I'll spare you the rest. Even Russian perspectives could be part of the discourse, perhaps even Ukrainian ones (and no, I don't mean the perspective of the Ukrainian government). But no way, we limit ourselves to the questionably framed "our freedom is being defended in Ukraine" perspective - and everything else is not only ignored, it is delegitimized.
Neither the cautious Ukraine supporters (Russia must not win) nor the aggressive Ukraine supporters (Russia must lose) can explain how this failure to win or even lossn Russia. How can we imagine this, especially today, towards the end of 2024, when the situation in Ukraine is becoming more and more desperate and the Russians are making ever faster progress in eastern Ukraine? There is less and less talk about the return of Crimea or all the other maximum demands that have always been propagated as a prerequisite for peace negotiations. Secretly, quietly and quietly, it seems to have been accepted that it will probably not work without compromises, but what a fair peace could look like is and remains completely unclear. What else is supposed to improve for Ukraine in the current situation, what is worth killing people on the front lines for day after day? Could someone please explain to me from the end how Russia will not have won and an acceptable peace could have been achieved? Without the delimitation of hostilities, without horizontal and/or vertical escalation, without a world war?
The difficulty of the apologists of the chosen strategy is shown by the strange formulations with which they torture our ears and insult our intelligence. Mr. H.H. also expressed himself very clumsily: "We must support Ukraine until Putin has won this war," he said on Lanz. And we need a situation in which others do not decide over the heads of the Ukrainians, or something like that. Until Putin has won this war? Aha, Mr. H.H., very interesting! And it is all the more interesting because the Russians are on the rise, Trump has won the election, Europe is divided and large parts of the "global south" support Russia rather than the West, if only because of the unbearable hypocrisy and arrogance that Western politicians repeatedly display.
How do you not lose, how do you win, what should or should not happen in each case? Those demanding arms deliveries, please explain it to us! We can't hope for miracles or divine intervention, can we? Nothing surprises me anymore! In my opinion, people like Anne Applebaum, who represent the extreme "Putin = Hitler position" and make correspondingly extreme demands, are particularly in need of explanation. When Ms. Applebaum received the Peace Prize(!) of the German Book Trade and was allowed to give a speech in the Paulskirche in connection with this, I was not surprised, for example, that the Polish-American neocon journalist demanded that the cult of violence in Russia should be ended militarily, just as it was ended in Germany in 1945. I knew the weakness of her arguments as well as the contradictions of her logic, and of course she ignores the fact that around 6,000 Russian nuclear warheads make the logic of war à la Berlin 1945 - let's say, somewhat problematic. Is she perhaps dreaming of the total capitulation of Russia in a bombed-out Moscow, with Putin putting a bullet through his head in the bunker? Even with conventional weapons, such a defeat of the Russians would result in unimaginable numbers of deaths, but the crucial question is but how can one prevent the use of nuclear weapons? I cannot imagine a situation that would lead to a nuclear holocaust as surely as the downfall of the Russian regime.
And just to be clear: I would also like to see the downfall of this regime and a completely different Russia! But anyone who does not see or does not want to see the unpleasant obstacles that lie between reality and desire is acting naively or lying. I was also not surprised that Applebaum's speech did not trigger a shitstorm. Indirectly calling for total war is within the permissible corridor of opinion, but calling for an end to arms deliveries or a less confrontational Russia policy is far outside it.
But the narrower this corridor becomes, the harder it is to ignore the elephant in the room: How does the West want to achieve its goals? How is Russia supposed to lose without using weapons of mass destruction, even as a last desperate act. I am also pretty sure that Mr. H.H.'s statements are also correct. will not trigger a shitstorm, because similar statements have been heard from other government and Union politicians in recent months, and as far as I can tell, there have never been any shitstorms. This is also about the now over-mentioned corridor of opinion, about the attitude towards those who dare, for example, to criticise the arms deliveries; it is about the understanding of democracy - and this point is also about contradictions. And Mr. H.H. provided a few excellent examples on Lanz that triggered me just as much as his cryptic and creative "until Putin has not won this war".
Even several minutes before he announced this supposed consensus forWhen he formulated a statement that we should all agree on, he said that we need to talk to citizens who have doubts, who are critical - I almost felt like I was being addressed! And yet I am not even a citizen of Germany! We must not put these doubtful and critical people in a corner, or something like that, said the Federal Minister. And yes, I absolutely agree with him! Please do not put me in a corner, perhaps even in the corner of Putin's friends! I am not a friend of Putin, I found him terrible 25 years ago, and I am not paid by Russia to criticize Western policy. (If anyone wants to pay me, please contact me!) Winking smiley. No, I am writing because no one is paying me at the moment and I therefore have time to write down my thoughts. Nothing more, nothing less.
Was I surprised by Mr. H.H.'s wisdom? Yes, indeed, because less than twenty seconds earlier he had spoken of "AfD-nosers" and "BSW activists", which he immediately excluded before talking about doubtful and critical citizens. In doing so, he did indeed put a not insignificant part of the population in a corner, which has now become a kind of sport among government representatives and Union politicians. Lanz has also often said, sometimes directly, sometimes indirectly, that these political fringes are not even counted among the "democratic parties". Lanz does not question such reports. In the program quoted here, Lanz also had no objections when Mr. H.H. did not want to put doubtful or critical citizens in a corner, but did not recognize AfD and BSW as either doubtful or critical citizens or not as legitimate citizens at all.
The talk show host only briefly questioned the adventurous formulation "AfD-nosers", whereupon Mr. H.H. made the "noses" into "people". However, this cosmetic correction did not change the content of the statement. I found the Federal Minister's explanation much more remarkable than the "noses": He was not talking about these "people" from the AfD and BSW because they "clearly do not represent the interests of this country and Europe". This is clear for Federal Minister H.H.! So clear that he does not even have to support his claim with arguments. I think this type of certainty is commonly referred to as "ideological".
To stay with the jargon of this text, Mr. H.H. sticks to its "official narrative" and does not tolerate any deviations that do not fit its central premises. This results in a narrowing of the corridor of opinion, which is also extended to the party landscape. Anyone who steps out of line is then quite simply no longer part of the "democratic parties", is declared a "nose", is excluded and put in a corner, even if a moment later they claim that they are not allowed to do exactly that! Should we laugh or cry?
Perhaps the Federal Minister should vote for another people, because I fear that the opposite will not work particularly well in the upcoming elections. He could vote for the Finnish people and emigrate. Here the Social Democrats are already in the opposition, share the right-wing government's stance on the Ukraine strategy and there are no level-headed hesitant people comparable to Scholz! Sounds good? But that is not an invitation from me, just satirical exaggeration! Just like the fact that Mr H.H. in the same program, he emphasized that one can have a different opinion. But only if the opinion is acceptable. The elephant may be the symbol of the Republicans, but here it is a (social) democratic elephant that is stuck in the narrow corridor of opinion and cannot move forward.
11/28/2024
Michael Klade (46) comes from Vienna, but has lived in Finland for many years, where he studied German, English and education. Over the years he has worked as a teacher at all school levels from preschool to university. When work and family neglect him, he likes to focus his energies on social issues. As an old German studies abroad and ex(iled) Austrian in the far north, he enjoys his outside perspective on the German-speaking countries.
Write a comment