How the ideology of empty coffers is ruining our country - My response to Offensive!
The right-wing online portal Offensiv! recently addressed my demand to take on an additional 200 to 300 billion euros in national debt every year, or rather, they completely missed the point. But before I address the substance of their criticism, I should first explain how I arrived at this figure.
By Konstantin Schink
By Konstantin Schink
An economy consists of four different sectors: the government, businesses, households, and the foreign sector. The net debt of one sector corresponds to the net savings of the other sectors. Households in almost all societies, at almost all times, save a certain portion of their income to prepare for lean times. During the economic boom of the 1950s to the 1970s, businesses in all Western industrialized countries were the primary debtors, and government deficits remained low because corporate debt was sufficient to offset household savings.
However, this changed fundamentally with the oil crises, which led central banks to significantly raise interest rates, thus stifling corporate investment. For several decades, the key interest rate in most industrialized countries was higher than the nominal growth rate, which acted as a prohibitive measure for investment. Until the global financial crisis of 2008, businesses in most countries shifted to the saving side.
But what happens when all sectors try to save? One person's spending is another's income, meaning that not everyone can save at the same time. If everyone tries to do so, demand falls, and consequently, so does national output. Savings are not held as cash, but rather in the form of bonds, stocks, and real estate, the value of which decreases in line with the lower output. This phenomenon--that an increase in savings reduces its value so drastically that, ultimately, less is saved--is known as the paradox of saving.
Saving always represents a drop in demand, which, if not offset by additional spending elsewhere, reduces the revenue of companies, who can then sell fewer products or must lower their prices. Companies react to falling profits by reducing production, for which they then need fewer workers. Therefore, saving is only possible from a macroeconomic perspective if someone else incurs debt.
Private households save more than EUR200 billion per year. In addition, companies, which have been net savers since 2003, save several tens of billions of euros. Germany's solution to this drop in demand is to have other countries take on the necessary debt. Since a detailed description of the wage-dumping strategy to boost the export industry would go beyond the scope of this discussion, we recommend a lecture by Heiner Flassbeck, which explains Germany's mercantilist strategy in more detail:
Link: https://youtu.be/guVuUZZFPpQ?si=zxcdTE6M4fViHpsX
This strategy of having our European trading partners take on the debt necessary for the German economy to continue growing reached its limits by the end of the 2010s at the latest. Demand from other European countries fell due to the austerity programs imposed by the EU, and some non-European trading partners, such as the USA under its then-President Donald Trump, began to resist German mercantilism. The German current account surplus reached its maximum in 2015, industrial production peaked in 2018, and the overall German economy has been shrinking since 2022.
` ... Germany has kept itself afloat at the expense of Italy, Spain, and France, and once that too was exhausted, it failed to fundamentally change its economic policy. This would have primarily meant government investment programs and significant wage increases to stimulate the domestic economy. This inaction cost our country ten lost years, during which it fell further behind competitors like the USA and China, which diligently incurred debt and consistently achieved higher growth.
My proposal that the German government should borrow an amount equivalent to the savings achieved annually by businesses and households--roughly 200 to 300 billion euros--is aimed at addressing this issue. Let's turn to the article in Offensiv!, where my proposal met with little enthusiasm.
[The sentence is incomplete in the original German text.] "Recently, the YouTuber 'Agitator of the Social Market Economy,' who describes himself as a non-partisan social democrat but now moves in the orbit of the political right, attracted attention with his demand that the state should take on 200 to 300 billion euros in debt annually to stimulate demand, lower taxes, increase pensions, and renovate infrastructure. What at first glance appears to be the ultimate solution to Germany's economic problems quickly reveals itself upon closer inspection as a utopian, if not dangerous, line of thinking that would produce the opposite of the desired results in almost every area."
Okay, nowI'm curious to know what exactly is supposed to be dangerous about the demand to pursue a fiscal policy similar to that of the USA.
"A central flaw in this argument, and at the same time a widespread fallacy in general, is the assumption that money equals prosperity."
No, that's a straw man argument. This assumption is neither explicitly nor implicitly included in my considerations.
"If you follow this logic to its logical conclusion, you could easily get the idea to simply print money to increase a country's prosperity. Our ancestors learned firsthand during the hyperinflation of 1923 that this doesn't work. So, if more debt is incurred without a corresponding increase in production, the purchasing power of money simply decreases."
The problem of the Weimar Republic wasn't the high levels of debt in its own currency that the German Reich incurred during the First World War, but rather the debts payable in kind and gold marks under the Treaty of Versailles. The central bank could print Reichsmarks without any problems, but not gold and coal. This was compounded by a supply shock following the occupation of the Rhineland by French troops. Neither an increase in the money supply nor an increase in national debt automatically leads to higher inflation.
The experience of the World Wars shows that even a significant expansion of national debt and the money supply in the domestic currency does not lead to capital flight and hyperinflation. The USA increased its debt relative to economic output from 6% (1916) to 35% (1918) during the First World War and from 43% (1940) to 112% (1945) during the Second World War. The money supply M2 increased two and a half times during the First World War and two and a half times during the Second. Hyperinflation did not occur in either case because the debt was used to increase the production of military goods without driving up the prices of consumer goods. After World War I, the US even experienced severe deflation, with an inflation rate of -10% in 1921. Debts denominated in domestic currency can be repaid without difficulty.
The situation is completely different, however, with debts denominated in foreign currency or commodities. When the central bank prints money to buy these things on the market, it sends the exchange rate plummeting, triggering a vicious cycle. The increased import prices are passed on to consumers almost immediately. Companies respond to these price increases with wage hikes to keep real wages stable, leading to a self-perpetuating spiral of rising wages and prices, which in turn further fuels capital flight as people lose confidence in the currency and turn to tangible assets and foreign currency.
Hyperinflation is a rare phenomenon that almost always occurs in conjunction with a supply shock and high levels of foreign currency debt. Debts denominated in domestic currency cannot trigger the spiral described above, as they can be serviced by the central bank at any time without printing money for this purpose affecting the exchange rate or inflation.
"Production increases through government debt only if profitable investments are made in infrastructure." "Rent increases, or simply stimulating demand, don't count."
This is a fundamental misconception held by many schools of economic thought, including the neoclassical school that dominates universities. Companies increase their production of goods whenever they can meet the increase in demand. If rents are increased through debt financing, then the consumption of pensioners rises according to their propensity to consume. Companies then respond to the rising demand by raising prices on the one hand and expanding supply on the other.
However, the increased prices need not be a permanent phenomenon. They make a sustained increase in production more profitable, and if raw material and labor prices remain unchanged, goods prices return to their previous, lower level. Only when labor or raw materials become scarce does the increased demand lead to sustained goods price inflation. It is unlikely that commodity prices, which are formed in a global market and heavily distorted by financial speculation, would be significantly influenced by a slightly higher demand from a country that accounts for just one percent of the world's population.
Too strong Wage increases resulting from a booming economy, on the other hand, can be a potential driver of inflation. Therefore, economic policy must always be careful that wages do not rise more sharply in the long term than the sum of target inflation and productivity growth. This does not mean, however, that the economy should be kept in a permanent state of underutilization out of fear of inflation.The result of this misguided policy can be seen not only in Germany, but throughout the EU - low growth rates and a fall behind competitors with more pragmatic economic policies.
It is a typical characteristic of liberal politics to avoid intervening in the free market for fear of undesirable consequences or excessive freedom of action and thus a concentration of power, and instead to manage problems that could be solved quite easily. This observation applies precisely to the economic decline that Germany is currently experiencing. The state could end it, but does not, out of concern for inflation, excessive national debt, or regulations such as the debt brake, which it has imposed on itself.
"Inflation is then the inevitable consequence, be it commodity inflation, like the kind we are experiencing today at the supermarket checkout, or asset inflation. The latter is called 'asset inflation.'"
Asset inflation occurs when the demand for assets increases. It's not enough to simply print money or for the government to spend more; more money must reach those who use it to buy real estate and stocks. If pensions are increased for people who consume most of their money or give it away to their children and grandchildren, then, as explained earlier, there is indeed a risk of goods inflation, but not of asset inflation. To trigger the latter, people with high savings rates--that is, the wealthy--would have to be given more money, something neoliberal governments of recent decades have done extensively through tax cuts and wage dumping.
"Even today, many economists, and laypeople alike, still subscribe to the assumption that government investment inevitably leads to higher demand, higher production, and ultimately, greater prosperity. However, this overlooks the fact that production doesn't simply follow demand, but rather price signals. Entrepreneurs always invest where they expect the highest possible profit." Beyond infrastructure construction, insofar as it makes sense, government intervention distorts these price signals by promoting projects that would not be viable under normal market conditions.
Reading this passage raises numerous questions for me. What are normal market conditions? What do undistorted price signals look like? What even constitutes a distortion? If pensions are increased, for example, pensioners demand more magazines and visit cafes. Why is that a distortion, but the increased demand for steel due to railway construction is not? The only thing that comes across in this rambling tirade is a fundamental resentment against a functioning state itself.
"The problem is made even more serious by the fact that many politicians steer investments not according to economic reason, but either according to ideological goals or according to which lobbyist has influenced them and how strongly. German climate policy is a prime example of both: Germany has spent hundreds of billions in attempts to combat climate change by subsidizing renewable energies." A whole ecosystem of opaque lobby groups, NGOs, and companies whose sectors are not viable without subsidies has sprung up. The Ministry of Economic Affairs under Robert Habeck was just the tip of the iceberg.
Of course, the current government makes numerous unnecessary or even harmful expenditures, but it does so despite the debt brake and the Maastricht deficit limits. The ideological intention to reduce government spending does not prevent corruption. The assumption that this is not the case, and that a more frugal state would automatically be more efficient and less corrupt, stems from an ideologically driven hostility towards the state that does not stand up to scrutiny. Neither a high national debt ratio nor a high government spending ratio can be linked to an above-average level of corruption. Is Somalia, with a government spending ratio of 7%, less corrupt than Jordan, with a government spending ratio of 34%, or France, with a government spending ratio of 58%? Are Lebanon, with a government spending ratio of 11%, or Haiti, with 8%, really governed so much more efficiently than countries like Japan, Sweden, Germany, or Hungary, where the state redistributes or uses roughly half of the economic output?
Here again, a fundamental hostility towards the state is evident, operating on the principle: if the state does nothing, it can't do anything wrong! Yet there is a very simple solution to the problems described, one that wouldn't require any neoliberal and growth-damaging austerity policies. If one doesn't want green front-line NGOs...If they are financed with public funds, then you simply don't give them any money. Should the ruling cartel ever be dismantled, its patronage system can be dismantled completely independently of the amount of government spending or national debt.
"High national debt is nothing more than plundering the future. Every euro that the government distributes on credit today must be repaid by taxpayers tomorrow--with interest."
National debt incurred for domestic spending automatically increases the population's income. The accumulated savings rates result in their wealth growth. If the euro that the government distributes isn't given away to Ukraine or Israel, but instead benefits pensioners, then it does indeed increase the population's wealth.
"In the short term, debt may have a positive economic effect, but in the long term, the debt burden of future generations grows."
If an action increases growth in the short term, then it must continue to increase growth even if it is repeated a hundred times in a row. If this isn't the case, then a very sound justification is needed. Why should different economic laws apply in the long run than in the short run? And what does the transmission mechanism between these timeframes look like? The article, like neoclassical economics itself, leaves these questions unanswered.
And there's a simple reason for this. There is no satisfactory answer. Since one would have to argue against all the experience of the last hundred years--given that almost every recession has been ended by debt-financed stimulus programs--for a fundamental rejection of government debt, one simply invents new relationships that only apply in the long run. This allows one to advocate for limiting government debt without having to deal with inconvenient counterexamples, all of which are simply attributed to the short run.
"Ultimately, this means nothing more than shifting the tax burden into the future. It is, of course, true that, as the social market economy agitator says, a state cannot technically go bankrupt in its own currency because it can print it at will." But with the money that comes into circulation, the state's debtors also want to buy something. Somewhere in the system, this creates a hidden tax that is only levied later, whether through commodity inflation, asset inflation, or some other means.
Unfortunately, the mechanism that causes additional debt to lead to tax increases, or what this hidden tax is supposed to be, is not explained. I have already explained the economic consequences of the additional expenses incurred by pensioners who benefit from higher pensions. However, the state's debtors are banks, which cannot buy anything with the additional central bank money that enters circulation. This central bank money is held by the ECB and generates interest for the banks. That's all that happens with it in our two-tier monetary system. Anyone who has a problem with financial capital profiting from state financing should advocate for the central bank to provide the government with its money directly, without going through the banking system, instead of demanding general restraint from the state.
This is particularly disastrous for younger generations, who already suffer under high taxes and the consequences of past policies, such as the failed [unclear - possibly "decision" or "decision"]. Pension policies must compensate for this. Often, they can barely accumulate any assets, and buying a home is usually an unattainable dream for them.
If we want to change these circumstances, we should support the development of private real estate ownership, but to do this, the state needs one thing above all: money. Support programs to increase homeownership rates can be financed much more easily if we don't let an ideology of empty coffers rob us of our own ability to act.
This is merely a brief critique of the demands of the social market economy advocate and similar unrealistic statements. It should by no means be interpreted as suggesting that a dogmatic focus solely on the economy, as is currently prevalent in liberal-conservative circles, could be the solution to all our problems. A sound right-wing position in economic policy must always emphasize that the economy should serve the people, not the other way around.
And the economy can best serve the people when the state intervenes as little as possible, one might add. If there is one thing that should be considered unrealistic and dangerous, it is not the demand for a pragmatic fiscal policy that takes into account the realities of cost-cutting businesses, but rather a liberal hostility towards the state.which undermines its own ability to act out of resentment.
If Germany is to have a future, then liberalism must be completely dismantled. This applies particularly to matters of economic policy.
Sources
Government spending as a percentage of various countries in 2022
US national debt:
August 28, 2025
Konstantin Schink (born November 8, 2001) graduated from high school in Lower Saxony in 2021. He is currently studying economics and politics in a double-major bachelor's program and runs the YouTube channels "Agitator of the social market economy" and "The secondary agitation".
However, this changed fundamentally with the oil crises, which led central banks to significantly raise interest rates, thus stifling corporate investment. For several decades, the key interest rate in most industrialized countries was higher than the nominal growth rate, which acted as a prohibitive measure for investment. Until the global financial crisis of 2008, businesses in most countries shifted to the saving side.
But what happens when all sectors try to save? One person's spending is another's income, meaning that not everyone can save at the same time. If everyone tries to do so, demand falls, and consequently, so does national output. Savings are not held as cash, but rather in the form of bonds, stocks, and real estate, the value of which decreases in line with the lower output. This phenomenon--that an increase in savings reduces its value so drastically that, ultimately, less is saved--is known as the paradox of saving.
Saving always represents a drop in demand, which, if not offset by additional spending elsewhere, reduces the revenue of companies, who can then sell fewer products or must lower their prices. Companies react to falling profits by reducing production, for which they then need fewer workers. Therefore, saving is only possible from a macroeconomic perspective if someone else incurs debt.
Private households save more than EUR200 billion per year. In addition, companies, which have been net savers since 2003, save several tens of billions of euros. Germany's solution to this drop in demand is to have other countries take on the necessary debt. Since a detailed description of the wage-dumping strategy to boost the export industry would go beyond the scope of this discussion, we recommend a lecture by Heiner Flassbeck, which explains Germany's mercantilist strategy in more detail:
Link: https://youtu.be/guVuUZZFPpQ?si=zxcdTE6M4fViHpsX
This strategy of having our European trading partners take on the debt necessary for the German economy to continue growing reached its limits by the end of the 2010s at the latest. Demand from other European countries fell due to the austerity programs imposed by the EU, and some non-European trading partners, such as the USA under its then-President Donald Trump, began to resist German mercantilism. The German current account surplus reached its maximum in 2015, industrial production peaked in 2018, and the overall German economy has been shrinking since 2022.
` ... Germany has kept itself afloat at the expense of Italy, Spain, and France, and once that too was exhausted, it failed to fundamentally change its economic policy. This would have primarily meant government investment programs and significant wage increases to stimulate the domestic economy. This inaction cost our country ten lost years, during which it fell further behind competitors like the USA and China, which diligently incurred debt and consistently achieved higher growth.
My proposal that the German government should borrow an amount equivalent to the savings achieved annually by businesses and households--roughly 200 to 300 billion euros--is aimed at addressing this issue. Let's turn to the article in Offensiv!, where my proposal met with little enthusiasm.
[The sentence is incomplete in the original German text.] "Recently, the YouTuber 'Agitator of the Social Market Economy,' who describes himself as a non-partisan social democrat but now moves in the orbit of the political right, attracted attention with his demand that the state should take on 200 to 300 billion euros in debt annually to stimulate demand, lower taxes, increase pensions, and renovate infrastructure. What at first glance appears to be the ultimate solution to Germany's economic problems quickly reveals itself upon closer inspection as a utopian, if not dangerous, line of thinking that would produce the opposite of the desired results in almost every area."
Okay, nowI'm curious to know what exactly is supposed to be dangerous about the demand to pursue a fiscal policy similar to that of the USA.
"A central flaw in this argument, and at the same time a widespread fallacy in general, is the assumption that money equals prosperity."
No, that's a straw man argument. This assumption is neither explicitly nor implicitly included in my considerations.
"If you follow this logic to its logical conclusion, you could easily get the idea to simply print money to increase a country's prosperity. Our ancestors learned firsthand during the hyperinflation of 1923 that this doesn't work. So, if more debt is incurred without a corresponding increase in production, the purchasing power of money simply decreases."
The problem of the Weimar Republic wasn't the high levels of debt in its own currency that the German Reich incurred during the First World War, but rather the debts payable in kind and gold marks under the Treaty of Versailles. The central bank could print Reichsmarks without any problems, but not gold and coal. This was compounded by a supply shock following the occupation of the Rhineland by French troops. Neither an increase in the money supply nor an increase in national debt automatically leads to higher inflation.
The experience of the World Wars shows that even a significant expansion of national debt and the money supply in the domestic currency does not lead to capital flight and hyperinflation. The USA increased its debt relative to economic output from 6% (1916) to 35% (1918) during the First World War and from 43% (1940) to 112% (1945) during the Second World War. The money supply M2 increased two and a half times during the First World War and two and a half times during the Second. Hyperinflation did not occur in either case because the debt was used to increase the production of military goods without driving up the prices of consumer goods. After World War I, the US even experienced severe deflation, with an inflation rate of -10% in 1921. Debts denominated in domestic currency can be repaid without difficulty.
The situation is completely different, however, with debts denominated in foreign currency or commodities. When the central bank prints money to buy these things on the market, it sends the exchange rate plummeting, triggering a vicious cycle. The increased import prices are passed on to consumers almost immediately. Companies respond to these price increases with wage hikes to keep real wages stable, leading to a self-perpetuating spiral of rising wages and prices, which in turn further fuels capital flight as people lose confidence in the currency and turn to tangible assets and foreign currency.
Hyperinflation is a rare phenomenon that almost always occurs in conjunction with a supply shock and high levels of foreign currency debt. Debts denominated in domestic currency cannot trigger the spiral described above, as they can be serviced by the central bank at any time without printing money for this purpose affecting the exchange rate or inflation.
"Production increases through government debt only if profitable investments are made in infrastructure." "Rent increases, or simply stimulating demand, don't count."
This is a fundamental misconception held by many schools of economic thought, including the neoclassical school that dominates universities. Companies increase their production of goods whenever they can meet the increase in demand. If rents are increased through debt financing, then the consumption of pensioners rises according to their propensity to consume. Companies then respond to the rising demand by raising prices on the one hand and expanding supply on the other.
However, the increased prices need not be a permanent phenomenon. They make a sustained increase in production more profitable, and if raw material and labor prices remain unchanged, goods prices return to their previous, lower level. Only when labor or raw materials become scarce does the increased demand lead to sustained goods price inflation. It is unlikely that commodity prices, which are formed in a global market and heavily distorted by financial speculation, would be significantly influenced by a slightly higher demand from a country that accounts for just one percent of the world's population.
Too strong Wage increases resulting from a booming economy, on the other hand, can be a potential driver of inflation. Therefore, economic policy must always be careful that wages do not rise more sharply in the long term than the sum of target inflation and productivity growth. This does not mean, however, that the economy should be kept in a permanent state of underutilization out of fear of inflation.The result of this misguided policy can be seen not only in Germany, but throughout the EU - low growth rates and a fall behind competitors with more pragmatic economic policies.
It is a typical characteristic of liberal politics to avoid intervening in the free market for fear of undesirable consequences or excessive freedom of action and thus a concentration of power, and instead to manage problems that could be solved quite easily. This observation applies precisely to the economic decline that Germany is currently experiencing. The state could end it, but does not, out of concern for inflation, excessive national debt, or regulations such as the debt brake, which it has imposed on itself.
"Inflation is then the inevitable consequence, be it commodity inflation, like the kind we are experiencing today at the supermarket checkout, or asset inflation. The latter is called 'asset inflation.'"
Asset inflation occurs when the demand for assets increases. It's not enough to simply print money or for the government to spend more; more money must reach those who use it to buy real estate and stocks. If pensions are increased for people who consume most of their money or give it away to their children and grandchildren, then, as explained earlier, there is indeed a risk of goods inflation, but not of asset inflation. To trigger the latter, people with high savings rates--that is, the wealthy--would have to be given more money, something neoliberal governments of recent decades have done extensively through tax cuts and wage dumping.
"Even today, many economists, and laypeople alike, still subscribe to the assumption that government investment inevitably leads to higher demand, higher production, and ultimately, greater prosperity. However, this overlooks the fact that production doesn't simply follow demand, but rather price signals. Entrepreneurs always invest where they expect the highest possible profit." Beyond infrastructure construction, insofar as it makes sense, government intervention distorts these price signals by promoting projects that would not be viable under normal market conditions.
Reading this passage raises numerous questions for me. What are normal market conditions? What do undistorted price signals look like? What even constitutes a distortion? If pensions are increased, for example, pensioners demand more magazines and visit cafes. Why is that a distortion, but the increased demand for steel due to railway construction is not? The only thing that comes across in this rambling tirade is a fundamental resentment against a functioning state itself.
"The problem is made even more serious by the fact that many politicians steer investments not according to economic reason, but either according to ideological goals or according to which lobbyist has influenced them and how strongly. German climate policy is a prime example of both: Germany has spent hundreds of billions in attempts to combat climate change by subsidizing renewable energies." A whole ecosystem of opaque lobby groups, NGOs, and companies whose sectors are not viable without subsidies has sprung up. The Ministry of Economic Affairs under Robert Habeck was just the tip of the iceberg.
Of course, the current government makes numerous unnecessary or even harmful expenditures, but it does so despite the debt brake and the Maastricht deficit limits. The ideological intention to reduce government spending does not prevent corruption. The assumption that this is not the case, and that a more frugal state would automatically be more efficient and less corrupt, stems from an ideologically driven hostility towards the state that does not stand up to scrutiny. Neither a high national debt ratio nor a high government spending ratio can be linked to an above-average level of corruption. Is Somalia, with a government spending ratio of 7%, less corrupt than Jordan, with a government spending ratio of 34%, or France, with a government spending ratio of 58%? Are Lebanon, with a government spending ratio of 11%, or Haiti, with 8%, really governed so much more efficiently than countries like Japan, Sweden, Germany, or Hungary, where the state redistributes or uses roughly half of the economic output?
Here again, a fundamental hostility towards the state is evident, operating on the principle: if the state does nothing, it can't do anything wrong! Yet there is a very simple solution to the problems described, one that wouldn't require any neoliberal and growth-damaging austerity policies. If one doesn't want green front-line NGOs...If they are financed with public funds, then you simply don't give them any money. Should the ruling cartel ever be dismantled, its patronage system can be dismantled completely independently of the amount of government spending or national debt.
"High national debt is nothing more than plundering the future. Every euro that the government distributes on credit today must be repaid by taxpayers tomorrow--with interest."
National debt incurred for domestic spending automatically increases the population's income. The accumulated savings rates result in their wealth growth. If the euro that the government distributes isn't given away to Ukraine or Israel, but instead benefits pensioners, then it does indeed increase the population's wealth.
"In the short term, debt may have a positive economic effect, but in the long term, the debt burden of future generations grows."
If an action increases growth in the short term, then it must continue to increase growth even if it is repeated a hundred times in a row. If this isn't the case, then a very sound justification is needed. Why should different economic laws apply in the long run than in the short run? And what does the transmission mechanism between these timeframes look like? The article, like neoclassical economics itself, leaves these questions unanswered.
And there's a simple reason for this. There is no satisfactory answer. Since one would have to argue against all the experience of the last hundred years--given that almost every recession has been ended by debt-financed stimulus programs--for a fundamental rejection of government debt, one simply invents new relationships that only apply in the long run. This allows one to advocate for limiting government debt without having to deal with inconvenient counterexamples, all of which are simply attributed to the short run.
"Ultimately, this means nothing more than shifting the tax burden into the future. It is, of course, true that, as the social market economy agitator says, a state cannot technically go bankrupt in its own currency because it can print it at will." But with the money that comes into circulation, the state's debtors also want to buy something. Somewhere in the system, this creates a hidden tax that is only levied later, whether through commodity inflation, asset inflation, or some other means.
Unfortunately, the mechanism that causes additional debt to lead to tax increases, or what this hidden tax is supposed to be, is not explained. I have already explained the economic consequences of the additional expenses incurred by pensioners who benefit from higher pensions. However, the state's debtors are banks, which cannot buy anything with the additional central bank money that enters circulation. This central bank money is held by the ECB and generates interest for the banks. That's all that happens with it in our two-tier monetary system. Anyone who has a problem with financial capital profiting from state financing should advocate for the central bank to provide the government with its money directly, without going through the banking system, instead of demanding general restraint from the state.
This is particularly disastrous for younger generations, who already suffer under high taxes and the consequences of past policies, such as the failed [unclear - possibly "decision" or "decision"]. Pension policies must compensate for this. Often, they can barely accumulate any assets, and buying a home is usually an unattainable dream for them.
If we want to change these circumstances, we should support the development of private real estate ownership, but to do this, the state needs one thing above all: money. Support programs to increase homeownership rates can be financed much more easily if we don't let an ideology of empty coffers rob us of our own ability to act.
This is merely a brief critique of the demands of the social market economy advocate and similar unrealistic statements. It should by no means be interpreted as suggesting that a dogmatic focus solely on the economy, as is currently prevalent in liberal-conservative circles, could be the solution to all our problems. A sound right-wing position in economic policy must always emphasize that the economy should serve the people, not the other way around.
And the economy can best serve the people when the state intervenes as little as possible, one might add. If there is one thing that should be considered unrealistic and dangerous, it is not the demand for a pragmatic fiscal policy that takes into account the realities of cost-cutting businesses, but rather a liberal hostility towards the state.which undermines its own ability to act out of resentment.
If Germany is to have a future, then liberalism must be completely dismantled. This applies particularly to matters of economic policy.
Sources
Government spending as a percentage of various countries in 2022
US national debt:
August 28, 2025
Konstantin Schink (born November 8, 2001) graduated from high school in Lower Saxony in 2021. He is currently studying economics and politics in a double-major bachelor's program and runs the YouTube channels "Agitator of the social market economy" and "The secondary agitation".
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